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„Perhaps  the  most  important  role  of  contracts  is  to  coordinate  the  actions  of  independent  decision 
makers.‟ 
Bogetoft and Olesen 2002, p189 
 
1 Introduction 
Specialization  is  attractive  according  to  the  law  of  comparative  advantages,  but  it  also  generates 
motivation and coordination problems due to the required exchange between specialized parties. The 
parties must be motivated to carry out their parts of the exchange, and the decisions and actions of the 
parties have to be coordinated to realize the gains of cooperation. A governance structure has to address 
these  problems  of  conflicting  as  well  as  joint  interests.  Motivation  problems  can  be  addressed  by 
designing incentives and assigning authority to reduce conflicts of interests and to provide the proper 
investment incentives, while coordination is required even if the parties involved have joint interests in 
order to focus on one course of action. The scientific literature has focused on analyzing the former, like 
in the agency literature (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). Coordination problems in a setting of joint interests have received limited attention during the 
last decades, but this is changing rapidly (for example, Alonso, et al., 2008; Dessein and Santos 2006). 
 
As the opening citation indicates, in many production and supply chains, coordination is the primary 
concern,  ensuring  that  production  is  optimized throughout  the  entire  production  chain  and  value  is 
created through joint actions. For example, the harvesting of fruits and vegetables must be coordinated 
to avoid capacity problems like congestion as well as idleness at the factory. Coordination problems 
arise when there are (positive) externalities between different organizational units (Lazear and Gibbs, 
2008). An example is double marginalization in a chain (Spengler, 1950). Vertical coordination entails 
aligning  interdependent  activities  of  various  actors  in  a  production  chain.  It  requires  complex 
information exchange, not only on supply and demand, but also on the quality requirements of retail 
customers  and  final  consumers.  The  introduction  of  new  products  and  improvement  of  logistic 
efficiency also require a coordinated effort of all actors in the value chain (Bijman et al, 2004). 
 
The literature on agricultural cooperatives pays noticeable attention to the coordination problem over 
time. Coordination aims to harmonize the economic activities of different economic units. It is intended 
to “achieve necessary adjustments of functioning of the participants without any encroachments upon 
their individuality or their independence” (Emelianoff 1948). It is widely applied in both cooperatives 
and  investor  owned  firms  (IOFs).  Shaffer  (1987)  argues  that  the  patron-owned  characteristics  of  a 
cooperative provide the potential for advantages in coordination for cooperatives since the coordination 
internalizes the vertical externality in a cooperative. However, he does not specify these advantages. 
Bogetoft and Olesen (2002) summarize ten rules of thumb in agricultural contract design and group 
them  into  three  categories  corresponding  to  the  overall  objectives  of  coordination,  motivation,  and 
minimization  of  transaction  costs.  Three  rules  relating  to  coordination  are  “coordinate  production”, 
“balance  the  pros  and  cons  of  decentralization”  and  “minimize  the  costs  of  risk  and  uncertainty”. 
However, a relationship between governance structure and coordination is not outlined. Bijman et al. 
(2004)  build  on  Thompson  (1967)‟s  theory  that  associates  three  types  of  coordination  mechanisms 
(standardization, plan, or mutual adjustment) to three types of interdependencies (pooled, sequential, or 
reciprocal), and apply it to various governance structures in the context of cooperatives. They establish 
that, if interdependencies shift from pooled to sequential to reciprocal, transactions will be governed in a 
more hierarchical way in order to economize on coordination costs. The reason is that more information 
has to be exchanged and more activities of various participants have to be aligned along the shift. 
           
This article contributes to the literature by relating coordination mechanisms and governance structures. 
We examine the choice of coordination mechanism in the relationship between input supplier and the   3 
processor of a certain good, and link it to the choice of governance structure, either a cooperative or an 
IOF.  Two  ingredients  drive  our  results:  externalities  and  uncertainty.  First,  a  cooperative  is  a  firm 
collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers. Members own collectively a joint 
resource where they either further process or market their produce. They delegate certain rights to the 
cooperative. Subsequently, the cooperative enterprise concludes contracts with members, specifying for 
example  delivery  requirements.  The  vertical  ties  between  the  members  and  the  processor  therefore 
consist of a transaction  element and an ownership element. An IOF processor is owned by outside 
investors and it has merely a transactional relationship with its input suppliers. The governance structure 
difference has an impact on the coordination problem. A cooperative takes into account the vertical 
externalities between member farms and the cooperative processor, whereas an IOF does not.
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Second,  agricultural  markets  are  subject  to  a  wide  range  of  risks  and  uncertainties.  Information 
asymmetry is precisely what we expect to see in this market. There are production risks pertaining the 
farm operations. Farmers‟ ability to plant and yield, and the costs of production are difficult to predict, 
“due  among  other  things,  to  varying  weather  conditions”  (Nilsson  2001,  p332).  Price  volatility  is 
another important source of risk. Agricultural commodity prices are subject to sharp fluctuations over 
relatively short periods of time and between geographical dispersed markets, depending on both local 
and global supply and demand conditions. Moreover, the market is also characterized by information 
asymmetry  among  parties  involved.  The  producers  have,  for  instance,  more  information  regarding 
production while the processors might be more knowledgeable about the market prices. We incorporate 
this latter uncertainty in the model and examine the implications for organizational structure choices. 
 
Our study can also be seen as an extension of institutional market failure analysis. Williamson (1975) 
makes it clear that trust and goodwill among businessmen are essential, “A better understanding of 
market failure might also come from studying how good estimates and revelations must be to allow 
approximate planning rather than studying how to elicit the truth” (Flaherty 1981, p524). 
         
We  analyze  the  choice  of  coordination  mechanism  in  the  relationship  between  a  producer  and  a 
processor governed by a cooperative or an IOF. Circumstances under which each governance structure 
is efficient are delineated. Section 2 characterizes the coordination problem. Section 3 sets up the model, 
followed by the equilibrium results in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Coordination as a game of multiple equilibria 
Classic definitions of management include often explicitly the coordination problem in characterizing 
the  field.  For  example,  Drucker  (1946)  states  that  „Management  science  is  the  science  of  the 
coordination of activities and processes, decision making in organizations, and optimal use of scarce 
resources  (human and financial capital,  materials,  equipment) in  order to reach favorable outcomes 
(products and services, employment, profit) for the organization‟. Organization theory (e.g. Thompson, 
1967; Galbraith, 1977) deals also with the coordination either within the boundaries of one organization 
or among collaborators in a partnership. This article addresses issues regarding coordination from an 
economic perspective. A coordination problem can be conceptualized as a game with multiple equilibria 
(Milgrom and Roberts  1992). To illustrate, consider a situation with  two growers  and a processor. 
Suppose each grower produces 1 unit harvest and has to decide to deliver it to the processor either today 
                                                        
1 Notice that the consolidation of ownership in cooperatives does not imply that the dominant coordination mechanism 
should  be  an  authority  relation.  Conversely,  an  authority  relation,  in  the  sense  of  quantity  instruction,  can  be  used 
independently from the centralization of ownership and/or residual income rights, such as the relational contracts among 
separate firms (Grandori 1997).  
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or tomorrow. The processor can handle 1 unit harvest during one day. Coordination entails that one 
grower delivers today and the other tomorrow. There are 2 equilibria: grower 1 delivers today and 
grower 2 delivers tomorrow, and vice versa. Lack of coordination entails parties may be focusing on 
different  equilibria,  resulting  in  a  coordination  problem.  For  example,  if  grower  1  focuses  on  the 
equilibrium where grower 2 is delivering tomorrow, and grower 2 is focusing on the equilibrium where 
grower 1 is delivering tomorrow, then there is congestion at the processor today and idleness tomorrow. 
          
Lazear and Gibbs (2008) distinguish two types of coordination problems. One is called synchronization 
problem which does not require parties involved to communicate to each other in order to coordinate. 
Examples are the synchronization of harvesting and processing of perishable products, the consistent 
overall product image, and uniform services provided by a firm at all of its retail locations. The other 
type is an integration problem. When there is specific knowledge rather than general knowledge in an 
organization that must be used to create firm value, and it is costly to communicate the knowledge to 
someone else, the integration problem arises. Should the decision making be centralized or decentralized 
is an example of such problem (Alonso, et al., 2008). Vertical or horizontal communication is needed to 
solve an integration problem. We look at the second type of coordination problems in the current article, 
more specifically, who and how to determine the efficient amount of production? 
 
The solution to a coordination problem entails that the game with multiple equilibria is transformed into 
a  game  with  one  equilibrium.  This  can  be  done  by  changing  the  (number  of)  players,  the  choice 
possibilities, the payoffs, the information structure, or the rules of the game. One way of solving the 
synchronization problem and achieving consistency across employees  and organizational units  is to 
standardize practices and implement standard operating procedures. It entails that the number of choice 
possibilities for each player is reduced to one. There is of course a unique equilibrium in a game where 
each player has only one choice possibility. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) identify two solutions for an 
integration problem, namely, centralization and decentralization. Each solution has its advantages and 
disadvantages. “Either the dispersed information must be transmitted to a central computer or planner 
who is expected to solve the resource allocation problem or else a more decentralized system must be 
developed that involves less information transmission and, correspondingly, leaves at least some of the 
calculations and decisions about economic activity to those with whom the relevant information resides. 
The trick with the first option is to make timely decisions while keeping the costs of communication and 
computation from absorbing all the available resources low. The challenge of decentralization is to 
ensure that the separately made decisions yield a coherent, coordinated result” (p26). 
 
Different organizational structures achieve coordination in an integration problem in different ways and 
with differing results. Weitzman (1974) makes this explicit by comparing the efficacy of instructions 
(centralization)  versus  price  signals  (decentralization).  For    a  quantity  control  to  work,  one  party 
specifies a quota, target, or command to produce a certain level of output, then the other party must obey 
without consideration of how costs will be met and how rewards will be distributed (Flaherty 1981). 
With price instruments, the rules specify explicitly or implicitly that profits are maximized at the given 
prices, taking into account the cost and revenue. A prominent example is US dairy marketing orders that 
establish minimum prices to be paid by the processors for milk purchased from producers. When there is 
no informational constraint, having the centre name prices while producers respond with quantities, or 
having the centre assign quantities while the producers reveal marginal costs does not make a difference. 
A more realistic issue of central control is to focus on the essential difference between quantities and 
prices as planning instruments when uncertainty is involved. Whether it is better to directly administer 
production under scrutiny, or to fix transfer prices and rely on self-interested profit maximization to 
achieve the same ends in decentralized fashion is contingent on the shape of the marginal cost and 
marginal revenue curves. Notice that the first solution establishes coordination by reducing the choice   5 
possibilities to one, while the second solution entails changing the payoffs. Mintzberg (1980) defines 
organizational structure as the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into distinct tasks and 
then  achieves  coordination  among  them.  He  distinguishes  five  coordination  mechanisms:  mutual 
adjustment, direct supervision, outputs, skills, and the standardization of work processes. We focus on 
the  two  mechanisms  suggested  by  Weitzman  (1974)  and  add  into  the  analysis  the  features  of  two 
governance structures.  In Weitzman‟s framework, both  mechanisms  operate on the  assumption that 
upstream units are obedient to downstream units. The coordination problem of concern is how to direct 
upstream actions with  minimal loss when the downstream director has imperfect information about 
upstream costs. In the current article, the choice of coordination mechanisms is made by the party who 
owns and controls the processing stage, i.e. farmer in a cooperative and processor in an IOF.  
 
3 Model 
This section presents a non-cooperative game model regarding the relationship between governance 
structure and coordination. The decision makers, information structure, choices, sequence of decisions, 
and payoffs will be specified. There are two parties: an upstream farmer and a downstream processor. 
The farmer is representative of all farmers together. The information structure specifies the uncertainty 
regarding  MR  and  MC.  Ex  ante  the  information  regarding  the  optimal  decision  is  hardly  exactly 
available even to the persons involved. However, one party may have more information at disposal than 
the other due to his position in the production process. We assume the incompleteness of information 
resides with the farmer in a cooperative (the processor in an IOF), i.e. the cooperative farmer (IOF 
processor) is unsure about the precise marginal revenue (marginal cost) function. Particularly, an IOF 
processor may lack certain information regarding the marginal costs of its upstream supplier while a 
cooperative processor may incorrectly estimate the benefits of processing (Fleherty 1981).
2 There are 
four choices to be made. First,  two governance structures are distinguished: a cooperative and an IOF. 
The identity of the party making the choice of coordination mechanism in the second stage of the game 
depends on the choice of governance structure. The farmer chooses the coordination device in a 
cooperative, while the processor makes this choice in an IOF. Second, in order to establish coordination 
between the upstream farmer and the processor, either the price or the quantity instrument may be 
adopted. That is, the cooperative can either specify an amount to be delivered or a price to its member 
farmer, while the IOF can either have a contract   with the farmer fixing the qu antity to supply or 
guarantee a price. Third, the farmer (processor) in a cooperative (an IOF) has to decide how much to 
produce (process) based on his information regarding MC (MR) and the guess of the MR (MC). Finally, 
the actual level of MR and MC has to be determined. The artificial player Nature chooses the level of 
the marginal costs to be either Low (MCL) or High (MCH), each with probability .5, and the level of the 
marginal  revenues  to  be  either  Bottom  (MRB)  or  Top  (MRT),  each  with  probability  .5.  The  game 
consists of four stages. The choice of governance structure (cooperative or IOF) is made in the first 
stage. A coordination mechanism (price coordination or quantity coordination) is then chosen by the 
farmer (the processor) in a cooperative (an IOF) in the second stage of the game. Subsequently the 
cooperative member make a guess regarding the MR of the processor, or the IOF processor makes a 
guess on the MC of the upstream farmer. In the fourth stage Nature reveals the real MR and MC. The 
payoff  differences  between  cooperative  and  IOF  are  due  to  their  different  objective  functions.  A 
cooperative takes into account not only the downstream surplus but also the upstream surplus while an 
IOF  processor  is  merely  concerned  with  the  downstream  surplus.  Namely,  a  cooperative  processor 
internalizes how its decisions affect the farmers, whereas an IOF processor does not. To delineate the 
implications  of  this  distinction  for  the  choice  of  coordination  mechanism  and  the  efficiency  of  a 
governance structure, we will specify the payoffs of the upstream farmer and the downstream processor. 
                                                        
2 Posing the problem this way implicitly entails assuming that the cost of communication between the parties is high enough 
to warrant consideration of these coordination mechanisms.   6 
Consider first a situation of a cooperative where the actual marginal revenue is MRB and the farmer has 
a belief either MRB or MRT (figure 1). Notice that by definition a cooperative acquires the entire surplus 
generated  in  the  transaction  whereas  the  processor  earns  nothing.  It  entails  that  the  payoff  of  the 
processor is always zero in a cooperative regardless of the choice of coordination mechanism and the 
belief of a farmer regarding the MR. If the farmer possesses an exact account of the MR, the upstream 
payoff is A+B regardless the choice of coordination mechanism. The price instrument will specify PE, 
and an output level QE will be chosen. The quantity instrument will specify QE. 
 
 
Figure 1: A cooperative 
 
When the farmer overestimates MR, the size of the surplus depends on the choice of coordination 
mechanism. The price instrument determines a transfer price PH. The processor faces a MC equal to PH 
and the intersection of PH and MRB determines that the processor procures an amount QL. The surplus is 
therefore A. Similarly, the quantity mechanism determines a quantity QH and the surplus is A+B-C. The 
payoffs when the actual MR is MRT and the farmer has a belief either MRB or MRT can be calculated in 
the same manner.
 3 Figure 2 depicts the extensive form when the governance structure cooperative is 
chosen in  the first  stage. The farmer chooses first  the coordination mechanism and then his  belief 
regarding MR. Subsequently, Nature determines the true level of MR. Finally, the first number presents 
the payoff of the farmer, while the number below is the payoff of the processor. The payoff of the 
processor  is  always  0  in  a  cooperative  because  the  farmer  receives  the  entire  surplus.  The  surplus 




                                                        
3 We limit the presentation of the extensive form in figure 1 to reflect the uncertainty regarding MR when a cooperative 
prevails. The two levels of MC would only result in presenting figure 1 twice. One figure would have MCL and the surfaces 
AL, BL, CL and DL, while the other figure would have MCH and the surfaces AH, BH, CH and DH. This is the reason why MC, 
rather than MCL and MCH, is presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 3: An IOF 
 
Consider next a situation where MCH  is the actual MC and the IOF processor‟s belief is either MCL or 
MCH. If the belief is consistent with the real MC, then the payoffs of the farmer and the processor are 
C+D+E and A+B (figure 3), respectively, regardless the choice of coordination mechanism. The price 
mechanism determines the transfer price PE, while the quantity mechanism determines the efficient 
quantity QE. If the processor underestimates MC, then the payoff of the farmer and the processor depend 
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is PL, i.e. the transfer price is determined by the intersection of MR facing the processor and MCL. An 
output  level  QL  will  be  chosen.  Thus  the  payoff  of  the  farmer  and  the  processor  are  E  and  A+C 
respectively. Similarly, if quantity instrument is chosen, the intersection of MR and MCL determines 
that  an  output  QH  has  to  be  delivered.  The  farmer  earns  E-D-2F-G,  while  the  processor  receives 
A+B+C+2D+F. The payoffs of both parties can be calculated in the same way when the actual marginal 
cost is MCL and the IOF processor‟s belief is either MCL or MCH. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the extensive form when the governance structure IOF is chosen in the first stage. The 
first number presents the payoff of the farmer, while the number below is the payoff of the processor. 
The payoffs in the various circumstances are retrieved from figure 3. The processor chooses first the 
























Figure 4: The extensive form of the game when the IOF prevails 
 
4 Equilibrium 
A cooperative takes into account not only the downstream surplus but also the upstream surplus, while 
an IOF processor is merely concerned with the downstream surplus. That is, a cooperative internalizes 
externalities, whereas an IOF does not. This entails that different coordination mechanisms may be 
employed  in  the  two  governance  structures.  This  claim  will  be  made  specific  by  determining  the 
subgame  perfect  equilibrium  of  the  model  with  the  method  of  backward  induction.  The  choice  of 
coordination mechanism in the second stage of the game is therefore addressed first, given the choice of 
governance structure. Subsequently, the choice of governance structure is addressed, anticipating the 
equilibrium choice of coordination mechanism in the next stage of the game. The choice of coordination 
mechanism in a cooperative is entirely guided by the size of the total surplus. We have therefore  
 
Proposition 1: The choice of coordination mechanism in a cooperative is efficient.  
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This proposition is consistent with the findings of Flaherty (1981). If the relation between upstream and 
downstream unit is expected to endure for a long time and if it is expected to require much renegotiation 
at each point in time because a lot of uncertainties are involved, then financial integration may generate 
more joint profits. For a cooperative, the expected payoffs of making a guess of B or T are identical, 
given the choice of coordination mechanism. The expected payoff is (2A+B+C+D)/2 when the price 
mechanism  is  chosen,  while  it  is  (2A+2B+D)/2  when  the  quantity  mechanism  is  adopted.  Both 
mechanisms generate the same surplus when the guess turns out to be right, but the surplus differs when 
the guess is wrong. The deadweight loss is B in case of the price mechanism and C when the quantity 
mechanism is used. We have therefore that the total surplus generated by a cooperative with the price 
instrument  is  higher  (lower)  than  the  total  surplus  generated  by  a  cooperative  with  the  quantity 
instrument when C>B (C<B). It can be shown (Weitzman, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) that C>B 
(C<B) corresponds with the slope of the MR being more (less) steep than the slope of the MC. Denote 
the slope of the MR as S
MR and the slope of the MC as S
MC. This result is summarized in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: A cooperative will choose the price (quantity) mechanism when S
MR  > S
MC (S
MR  < S
MC). 
 
This  result  indicates  that  a  market  mechanism  like  the  price  can  be  efficiently  used  in  addition  to 
hierarchy within a single firm, i.e. even if property rights over assets are not assigned to difference 
actors. There are situations where either price or quantity must be used to minimize losses in net joint 
profits. 
  
It is obvious that the choice of coordination mechanism in an IOF is not always efficient because it is 
based only on the downstream payoff rather than total surplus. For example, payoff G (figure 3) is never 
taken into account by the processor. The extensive form in figure 4 reveals immediately that the quantity 
instrument performs better from the processor‟s point of view. The processor receives the same payoffs 
when the guess turns out to be right, but her payoff will be strictly lower with the price instrument when 
the guess is wrong because a larger share of the surplus goes to the upstream farmer. This result is 
formulated in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: An IOF will choose the quantity mechanism.  
 
Figure 5 visualizes the insight of propositions 2 and 3. The choice of coordination mechanism by each 
governance  structure  is  presented  in  terms  of  S
MR  and  S
MC,  where  j
i  represents  the  choice  of 
coordination mechanism j (Q or P) by governance structure i (C for cooperative or F for IOF).  
 
 
Figure 5: Choice of coordination mechanism 
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An IOF chooses a coordination mechanism based on the downstream surplus it acquires. Therefore the 
choice is not necessarily optimal in terms of total surplus. Yet an efficient coordination mechanism can 
be chosen if both the downstream surplus and the total surplus generated with a certain mechanism are 
higher than those with the other mechanism. We know already from proposition 3 that the downstream 
surplus  associated  with  quantity  control  is  higher  than  that  associated  with  price  control.  So  we 
investigate next if and when the total surplus associated with quantity control exceeds that associated 
with price control. The total surplus of an upstream farmer and an IOF processor can be represented by 
the  area  of  2A+B+2C+2D+2E+F+G+H  when  the  price  control  is  applied  and  by  the  area  of 
2A+2B+2C+3D+2E+H when the quantity control is used. It can be shown that the quantity control is 
more attractive than the price control when S
MR > S
MC. This result is stated in proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: The choice of coordination mechanism in an IOF is efficient when S
MR > S
MC. 
      
Figure 6: An illustration of total surplus generated in two governance structures 
 
Having  determined  the  efficient  coordination  mechanism  choice  for  each  governance  structure,  we 
identify next the efficient governance structure. It will depend on the choice of coordination mechanism 
and the extent to which MR or MC is over/under estimated. The argument is presented for the case 
where S
MR  < S
MC and MCH and MRB are the true MC and MR curves (figure 6). Denote the vertical 
distance between the actual and estimated MC as ΔC and that between the actual and estimated MR as 
ΔR. Notice that (line segment DE implies that) ΔC is taken to be equal to ΔR in figure 6. According to 
proposition 2, a cooperative will choose the quantity mechanism when S
MR < S
MC, and the total surplus 
can be represented by the area of ABC-ADE. According to proposition 3, an IOF will always choose the 
quantity control and the total surplus can also be represented by the area of ABC-ADE. That is, a 
cooperative and an IOF are equally efficient when ΔC = ΔR. 
 
Suppose  the cooperative‟s information about the MR is more accurate, i.e. ΔR < ΔC. It is represented in 
figure 6 by a downward shift of the estimate MR curve to MR‟T. The total surplus increases to ABC-
AGH, making a cooperative uniquely efficient. Likewise, an IOF will become uniquely efficient if its 
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that when S
MR > S
MC, a cooperative is uniquely efficient if ΔR < (S
MR / S
MC) *ΔC and an IOF is 
uniquely efficient if ΔR > (S
MR / S
MC) *ΔC
4. This result is summarized in proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5: When S
MR < S
MC, a cooperative (an IOF) is uniquely efficient if ΔR < ΔC (ΔR > ΔC); 
when S
MR > S
MC, a cooperative is uniquely efficient if ΔR < (S
MR / S
MC) *ΔC and an IOF is uniquely 




We  have  shown  earlier  that  the  choice  of  coordination  mechanism  in  a  cooperative  is  efficient 
(proposition 1), whereas it is not always in an IOF. However, a loss of surplus is associated with both 
coordination  mechanisms.  This  is  inevitable  due  to  the  lack  of  information.  The  cooperative  lacks 
information regarding MR, whereas the IOF lacks information regarding the MC. An IOF may therefore 
be  an  efficient  governance  structure  when  its  estimate  of  MC  is  more  accurate  compared  to  a 
cooperative‟s estimate of MR, despite its choice of coordination mechanism being inefficient.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The coordination mechanism choice in cooperative and IOF and the efficiency of the two governance 
structures is analyzed. Due to the “owner as user” characteristic, a cooperative internalizes the vertical 
externalities between upstream producers and the downstream processor, maximizing their joint profits, 
and will adopt therefore the efficient coordination mechanism.  This contrasts with IOFs, where the 
coordination mode linking the upstream and downstream units is not always efficient. The slope of the 
MC and MR determines whether the price or quantity control is adopted. Each governance structure can 
be uniquely efficient, which depends on the importance of lacking information upstream or downstream. 
It is undoubtedly worthwhile to test the propositions. Even though a general prediction on governance 
structure or coordination mechanism requires examining all the activities performed by the constituent 
units and all the relevant conditions, we expect that a good prediction may be made by studying only the 
most  important  attributes.  However,  we  leave  careful  testing  for  later,  we  proceed  to  list  some 
extensions to the theory required to make it more useful and closer to the real practices.  
 
There are various possibilities for future research regarding the relationship between coordination and 
governance structure. We indicate two. First, a simplifying assumption of our model is that there are 
physical communication constraints between the producers and the processors, which limits information 
transmission between the party that is best informed and the party with a natural disadvantage.  An 
obvious way to enrich the model is to incorporate the informational flow. The cooperative members may 
be  more  willing  to  provide  higher  quality,  more  frequent,  and  more  truthful  information  to  the 
cooperative than they would to an IOF (Cook, 1994), rendering better vertical information transmission 
in a cooperative than in an IOF. This suggests an additional advantage of coordination by cooperatives. 
One can go even further to examine the conditions under which the costly communication is worthwhile. 
Second, a cooperative is characterized by a processor (or wholesaler, or retailer) being owned by an 
upstream party (vertical relationship), where the upstream party consists of an association of many 
independent growers (horizontal relationship). This article has addressed coordination issues regarding 
the  vertical  relationship.  Hart  and  Holmstrom  (2010)  address  issues  regarding  governance  and 
coordination between units that have a lateral relationship. Future efforts might be fruitfully devoted to 
investigating how the vertical alignment interacts with the horizontal coordination between the members. 
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